Barbary Pirates

From Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia

For many years, the states of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco profited from raiding unprotected ships in the Mediterranean Sea. The Barbary Pirates, as they were often called by Western powers, would seize ships, cargo and crews and either sell them for a profit or extract ransom money or tribute treaties from the governments of their home countries. Under the terms of most tribute treaties, the government made an annual payment to one or more of the Barbary states in exchange for immunity from pirate attacks. The British government started paying this tribute and ransom as early as 1646. Most European nations followed suit, having decided that such payments were more cost-effective than sending ships to patrol the area. These "treaties" sometimes held; if not, the pirates would resume their attacks, and the European nations in question would pay more bribe money and establish new treaties. The United States acted somewhat differently than the Europeans in this regard, for several reasons. The U.S. did not have sufficient monetary resources to sustain tribute treaties; the new United States government also wanted to distinguish itself in its diplomatic relations from its mother country and other European governments.

Thomas Jefferson supported U.S. trade in the Mediterranean and believed that the trade in this region would grow over time; therefore, United States interests in the region needed protection. Throughout his tenure as minister to France, he and John Adams in London dealt with negotiations to release U.S. captives and treaty tributes from the Barbary states. Jefferson strongly opposed tributes and ransoms on the basis of economics, believing that immediate force was less expensive than long-standing tribute over time. He supported a convention or union of force between the U.S. and other countries to patrol the Mediterranean Sea.[1] In a letter to John Adams dated July 11, 1786 Jefferson wrote, “I acknoledge I very early thought it would be best to effect a peace thro’ the medium of war... 1. Justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will procure us respect in Europe, and respect is a safe-guard to interest. 4. It will arm the federal head with the safest of all the instruments of coercion over their delinquent members and prevent them from using what would be less safe...6. Equally effectual.”[2] Although this convention never materialized largely due to French disinterest, Jefferson remained steadfast in his opinion that using force was the best policy.

When Jefferson entered his first term as President, relations with Tripoli were in shambles. The Pasha of Tripoli was unsatisfied with the treaty and tributes enacted in 1796 by the U.S. government. He was also jealous of the leader of Algiers, who was getting more money in his treaty. The Pasha of Tripoli began to allow pirates to attack American ships. On September 25, 1800, the U.S. brig Catherine was captured, held for a month, and then released. On May 15, 1801, Jefferson had his first full cabinet meeting to discuss whether the U.S. should send a naval force to the Mediterranean. This became a constitutional question of how far presidential powers extended regarding military action. Attorney General Levi Lincoln believed that U.S. vessels were justified in attacking individual vessels only if they themselves were attacked, but purposefully seeking out and destroying the Barbary fleet was beyond their purview. Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin and the acting Secretary of the Navy, Samuel Smith, believed the president was justified in ordering the destruction of the Barbary fleet if U.S. vessels were attacked. Jefferson favored the latter approach, and ordered a force of four ships to sail to the Mediterranean. Later in May 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli declared war on the United States, demanding more tribute. On June 11, 1801, Jefferson wrote to Wilson Cary Nicholas of his attitude regarding tribute, “…being convinced it is money thrown away, and that there is no end to the demand of these powers, nor any security in their promises.” [3]

However, four ships were not enough and by 1804, six more vessels were in the region under the command of Commodore Edward Preble, including the larger frigates Philadelphia and Constitution. In one battle, the Philadelphia ran aground and the ship and crew were captured. In a daring move on February 16, 1804, Lt. Stephen Decatur slipped into Tripoli harbor and burned the ship. On April 27, 1805, General William Eaton, along with seven marines and several hundred mercenaries, marched overland from Egypt into the Tripolitan city of Derna and seized it. After this event, the Pasha made peace with the United States.

By 1805, the political situation in the United States had changed. Gallatin was worried about the further expense, the United States having incurred substantial debt as a result of the Louisiana Purchase. Also, the war in Europe was gaining momentum and there was concern that prolonged presence of U.S. military forces in the area could become problematic. The 1805 treaty with Tripoli included a $60,000 ransom for prisoners, but the practice of annual tribute to the Barbary states was halted. The Senate ratified the treaty on April 12, 1806 with a vote of 21 to 8.

This treaty did not solve the problem of Barbary attacks on American ships in the Mediterranean. After U.S. military forces withdrew in 1807, there were still ship seizures, and this problem continued until 1815. However, this war reinforced the need for a small, efficient standing military force for the United States in order to maintain the safety of trade routes and diplomatic standing.

Footnotes

  1. ↑ See Proposed Convention against the Barbary States - written before July 4, 1786, PTJ, 10:566-568.
  2. ↑ Ibid, 10:123.
  3. ↑ Ford, 9:265.

Further Sources

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